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Abstract
We explore some implications of the hypothesis that quantum mechanics (QM) is
universal, i.e., that QM does not merely describe information accessible to observers,
but that it also describes the observers themselves. From that point of view, “free
will” (FW) – the ability of experimentalists to make free choices of initial conditions
– is merely an illusion. As a consequence, by entangling a part of brain (responsible
for the illusion of FW) with a distant particle, one may create nonlocal correlations
that can be interpreted as superluminal signals. In addition, if FW is an illusion,
then QM on a closed timelike curve can be made consistent even without the Deutch
nonlinear consistency constraint.
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1 Introduction
In quantum-information theory, quantum mechanics (QM) is widely viewed as a purely
instrumental tool that describes information accessible to observers. The observers them-
selves are not described by QM, but are viewed as external subjects which may manipulate
accessible information in various ways. In particular, observers are assumed to have “free
will” (FW) – the apparent ability of experimentalists to make free choices of initial con-
ditions. Some implications of this assumption in QM have been discussed in [1, 2] (see
also [3, 4, 5] for critiques).
Nevertheless, such an instrumental view is not the only possible interpretation of QM.
In particular, the existence of FW may not be a fundamental property of observers.
Instead, FW may be an emergent feature resulting from complex dynamics in the brain.
Namely, an observer cannot be aware of all processes in his brain. Events determined
by causes which he is not aware of may be interpreted by his consciousness as being
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determined by FW, even if the true FW does not exist. In this way, FW may be merely
an illusion.
From the practical point of view, it may seem irrelevant whether FW is a genuine
ability of experimentalists or merely an illusion. Yet, in this paper we argue that this
distinction may be of a practical relevance. More specifically, in Sec. 2 we study the
possibility that QM is a universal theory, i.e., that QM describes everything, including
the human brain. It turns out that the absence of true FW is a natural consequence
of universal QM, and that the illusion of FW can in principle be explained. Using this
insight, we then discuss two different implications that may be of a practical interest.
First, in Sec. 3 we argue that universal QM contains a theoretical possibility to use
nonlocal entanglement for a sort of superluminal signalization, or more precisely, for the il-
lusion of superluminal signalization that for all practical purposes cannot be distinguished
from a true one. The crucial idea is to use one of the entangled particles to affect in an
appropriate way the part of brain responsible for the creation of the illusion of FW.
Second, in Sec. 4 we discuss the implications on QM at closed timelike curves (CTC’s).
The most popular approach to QM on CTC is the Deutsch [6] nonlinear self-consistency
constraint. The nonlinearity of the constraint leads to various unusual effects that cannot
be realized within ordinary linear QM, the interest in which is increasing [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11,
12, 13, 14]. Recently, some alternatives to the Deutch approach have also been proposed
[15, 16]. We show that universal QM also provides a simple alternative to the Deutch
nonlinear consistency constraint.
Finally, the conclusions are drawn in Sec. 5.
2 Universal QM and illusional FW
The idea of universal QM is that there is no fundamental difference between “micro-
scopic” quantum systems, “macroscopic” classical systems, and observers. Instead, at
the fundamental level, everything obeys the quantum laws of physics in universal QM. In
particular, a measurement can be described by the von Neumann measurement scheme,
in which measurement is nothing but entanglement between the measured system and
the measuring apparatus. For example, if the measured system is in the spin-1
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state | ↑〉
and if the role of the measuring apparatus is played by the brain, then a non-demolition
measurement of the state |↑〉 can be described by a unitary evolution
|↑〉 |brain ready〉 → |↑〉 |brain observes up〉, (1)
where |brain ready〉 is the initial state of the brain and |brain observes up〉 is its final
state. Similarly, if the measured system is in the state | ↓〉, then the non-demolition
measurement is described by
|↓〉 |brain ready〉 → |↓〉 |brain observes down〉. (2)
If the initial state is in the superposition (|↑〉+ |↓〉), then (1), (2), and the superposition
principle imply the unitary evolution
(|↑〉+ |↓〉)|brain ready〉
→ |↑〉 |brain observes up〉
+|↓〉 |brain observes down〉. (3)
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Similarly, if the initial state is the Bell state (| ↑〉| ↓〉d + | ↓〉| ↑〉d), where | ↓〉d and | ↑〉d
denote the states of a distant particle entangled with the particle measured by the brain,
then (3) modifies to
(|↑〉|↓〉d + |↓〉|↑〉d)|brain ready〉
→ |↑〉|↓〉d |brain observes up〉
+|↓〉|↑〉d |brain observes down〉. (4)
The different brain states |brain observes up〉 and |brain observes down〉 are macroscopi-
cally distinguishable, so the two terms on the right-hand sides of (3) and (4) can be thought
of as two distinguishable branches of the wave function. The macroscopic distinguisha-
bility of the branches significantly helps to understand why only one of the branches is
observed, i.e., how unitary evolution leads to an apparent “collapse” of the wave function.
Such a von Neumann description of quantum measurements (not necessarily with brains)
plays a crucial role in the theory of decoherence [17, 18], as well as in the many-world
[19, 20] and Bohmian [21, 22] interpretations of QM.
The above description of measurement in universal QM is indeed a well-known result.
But can the appearance of FW be also described by universal QM? Here we propose
a quantum description of the emergence of the illusion of FW, by a mechanism very
similar to the von Neumann description of quantum measurements. We assume that
the “decisions” of the brain are determined by external influences from the environment,
where “external” refers to influences which are neither controlled nor consciously observed
by the brain. In the first step an appropriate external influence causes the brain to make
a corresponding decision. After that, in the second step the brain commands the body to
perform the decided action.
For example, if the external influence is described by a quantum state |up〉 and if the
final action corresponds to a preparation of another quantum system in the state |ψ↑〉,
then the whole process can be schematically described by a two-step unitary process
|up〉 |brain undecided〉 |ψ0〉
→ |up〉 |brain decides up〉 |ψ0〉
→ |up〉 |brain decides up〉 |ψ↑〉. (5)
Here it is assumed that the brain is conscious about the brain states |brain undecided〉
and |brain decides up〉, but that it is not conscious about the external influence |up〉.
Similarly, if the external influence is in the state |down〉, then we have a similar unitary
process
|down〉 |brain undecided〉 |ψ0〉
→ |down〉 |brain decides down〉 |ψ0〉
→ |down〉 |brain decides down〉 |ψ↓〉. (6)
If the brain does not know whether the initial influence is |up〉 or |down〉, then the decision
does not look to the brain as being predefined by the initial influence. Instead, the brain
interprets his decisions as being determined by FW, despite the fact that FW does not
really exist. That is how the illusion of FW may emerge from fundamental quantum
dynamics.
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3 Superluminal signals
As is well known, nonlocal quantum correlations (as, e.g., in the state (4)) cannot be used
for superluminal signalization. A standard explanation of this fact is as follows: A signal
in a practical sense is information chosen by a human and sent to a receiver. On the other
hand, a human cannot freely decide which of the two possibilities on the right-hand side
of (4) will be realized. Instead, this “decision” is done by nature, in a random manner.
Thus, since a human cannot freely decide which information will be sent, the nonlocal
correlations cannot be interpreted as superluminal signals.
Yet, there is something potentially disturbing with this standard explanation. First,
if true FW does not exist, then humans cannot ever choose anything. Does it also mean
that they can never send any kind of signals, not even signals slower than light? And
second, if this is so, then what is special about the inability to send superluminal signals?
The answer to the first question is that even though true signals cannot be sent when
true FW does not exist, it is irrelevant from the practical point of view. As long as the
illusion of FW exists (in a form which, for all practical purposes, cannot be distinguished
from true FW), the illusion of ability to send signals exists as well. And for all practical
purposes, such illusional signals cannot be distinguished from true signals.
But what about the second question? If all practical signals are actually illusional
signals, then what is special about superluminal signals? Or more constructively, is it
possible to use nonlocal quantum correlations to create an illusion of superluminal signal-
ization which, for all practical purposes, could not be distinguished from true superluminal
signalization? Below we argue that it is possible! But before that, as a prerequisite we
need to introduce one additional new idea – the idea of quantum suggestion.
Humans are suggestive beings. They are often inclined to “decide” to do what others
have suggested them to do. Sometimes, they are not even aware that their “decision” was
influenced by an external suggestion. (For example, this can be achieved by hypnosis or
by certain subtle forms of advertisement.) In such a case, a person may be convinced that
he made a free decision by himself, even though his “decision” was actually manipulated
through an external suggestion. In practice, such suggestions can be easily transferred to
humans by “classical” signals – signals that can be described in terms of classical physics.
Nevertheless, in principle, the signal could also be a quantum signal. The quantum
suggestion is a suggestion transferred to a human through a quantum signal.
Essentially, a quantum suggestion can be described as a variant of the process (5) in
which the uncontrolled external influence |up〉 is replaced by an external influence | ↑〉
controlled by an external manipulator. Thus (suppressing the analog of the intermediate
step in (5)) we have
|↑〉 |brain undecided〉 |ψ0〉
→ |↑〉 |brain decides up〉 |ψ↑〉. (7)
As in (5), it is assumed that the manipulated brain is not aware of the existence of
the external influence | ↑〉. Instead, the owner of the brain has the impression that he
freely decided to prepare the other quantum system in the state |ψ↑〉. To achieve this
in practice, presumably the manipulator could provide that | ↑〉 interacts only with the
part of the brain which is responsible for the illusion of FW. Completely analogously, the
4
quantum-suggestion variant of the process (6) is given by
|↓〉 |brain undecided〉 |ψ0〉
→ |↓〉 |brain decides down〉 |ψ↓〉. (8)
Now we are ready to describe how the illusion of superluminal signalization could be
achieved by an entanglement similar to (4). The manipulator first prepares the Bell state
(|↑〉|↓〉d+|↓〉|↑〉d) describing a pair of entangled particles. After that, he uses one member
of the pair to perform the quantum suggestion described by (7)-(8). This means that we
have a unitary transition
(|↑〉|↓〉d + |↓〉|↑〉d)|brain undecided〉 |ψ0〉
→ |↑〉|↓〉d|brain decides up〉 |ψ↑〉
+|↓〉|↑〉d|brain decides down〉 |ψ↓〉. (9)
Of course, there may be many technical difficulties to achieve this in practice, but it
is conceivable that all these difficulties could be resolved by an advanced technology.
(Perhaps it would be easier to resolve these difficulties than to create a CTC needed for
thought experiments discussed in [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14].)
Now it is easy to see that (9) corresponds to an illusion of FW. Let the owner of the
manipulated brain be called Alice. Let us also introduce a distant observer Bob who
measures the distant state (| ↓〉d, | ↑〉d, or a superposition of them). Whenever Alice
decides to prepare the quantum state |ψ↑〉, Bob finds that the state measured by him is
|↓〉d. Likewise, whenever Alice decides to prepare the quantum state |ψ↑〉, Bob finds that
the state measured by him is |↓〉d. As long as Alice believes that she made her decisions
freely, she will naturally interpret such a correlation as superluminal signalization. From
her and Bob’s point of view, such superluminal signalization may even be useful (i.e., they
would probably feel happy to communicate in such a way). Of course, the manipulator
knows that the Alice’s decisions are not really free and consequently that all this is not a
true superluminal communication. Yet, Alice and Bob are not able to see a difference.
Consider also the situation in which Alice, puzzled by her apparent ability to send
superluminal signals, suspects that her decisions are not really made freely by her. How
would she interpret the correlations above in that case? If | ↓〉d and | ↑〉d are eigenstates
of the spin-operator in the z-direction and if Bob only measures spins in the z-direction,
then Alice does not need to use quantum nonlocality to explain the correlations. Instead,
she can also explain the correlations by assuming that both her decisions and states
measured by Bob were predetermined in a local classical manner. On the other hand, if
Bob measures spin in various directions, and if the direction in which the brain makes
decisions also varies, then the correlations take a rather non-trivial form, such as those
that violate the Bell inequalities [23]. (In order to vary the direction in which the brain
makes decisions, the external manipulator has to replace (7) and (8) with different unitary
transformations
|↑′〉 |brain undecided〉 |ψ0〉
→ |↑′〉 |brain decides up〉 |ψ↑〉, (10)
|↓′〉 |brain undecided〉 |ψ0〉
→ |↓′〉 |brain decides down〉 |ψ↓〉, (11)
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where | ↑′〉 (| ↓′〉) is the state with spin up (down) in another direction.) The simplest
known way to explain such non-trivial correlations is, of course, through universal QM,
as described in this paper. But could such correlations be explained by local hidden
variables? Naively, one could argue that they could not, owing to the Bell theorem [23].
However, one should be aware that the assumption of FW plays an important role in
the derivation of the Bell theorem [24] (see also [1, 2]). At the same time, one should
not forget that in this paragraph we consider a situation in which Alice does not assume
FW. Hence, in this context Alice cannot unequivocally exclude the possibility that all
correlations are caused by local hidden variables [25]. Yet, QM (possibly supplemented
by nonlocal hidden variables such as Bohmian ones [23, 26]) seems to be the simplest
explanation of such correlations.
4 QM on closed timelike curves
CTC’s are a potential source of various paradoxes in physics, most of which can be reduced
to a variant of the “grandfather paradox” – the paradox resulting from a possibility to
kill your own grandfather before you were born, making it inconsistent with the fact
that you exist in the presence. Such paradoxes can be avoided by the self-consistency
principle [27, 28], according to which only self-consistent solutions are physical. The self-
consistency principle can be applied to both classical and quantum mechanics. However,
the self-consistency principle imposes strong constraints on possible initial conditions,
by excluding most of them as unphysical. This feature is rather unattractive to many
physicists, because the constraint on initial conditions clashes with FW. Thus, to save
FW, Deutsch [6] has proposed a more imaginative resolution of the paradox within QM,
in which a self-consistency constraint is not imposed on the wave function (pure state)
describing the whole system, but on the density matrices describing the subsystems some
of which live on a CTC.
Here we propose an alternative to the Deutch nonlinear consistency condition. We
reconsider the simplest and the most obvious variant (discussed already in [6]) of the
quantum self-consistency principle, according to which the self-consistency principle is
imposed on the wave function (pure state) describing the whole system. As shown in [6],
it avoids the logical paradoxes but clashes with FW. We point out that clash with FW is
not an inconsistency in universal QM, because there true FW does not really exist.
The simplest way to make QM on CTC consistent is to require that the pure state
|Ψ(t)〉 describing the whole system of all degrees of freedom is a single-valued function of t.
Clearly, this self-consistency requirement is linear; if |Ψ1(t)〉 and |Ψ2(t)〉 are single-valued
functions, then c1|Ψ1(t)〉 + c2|Ψ2(t)〉 is also a single-valued function. However, when a
CTC is present, then, for most initial conditions |Ψ(0)〉, the self-consistency requirement
is not compatible with unitary evolution of |Ψ(t)〉 [6]. Thus, this self-consistency principle
implies that only a small subset of possible initial conditions on CTC represents the set
of physically possible initial conditions.
Is such a restriction on initial conditions physically acceptable? It crucially depends
on interpretation of QM that one adopts. In particular, in quantum-information theory,
QM is widely viewed as a purely instrumental tool that describes information accessible
to observers, where observers are assumed to have FW. Thus, from this point of view,
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the restriction on initial conditions does not seem acceptable, which was the Deutch’s
motivation to abandon the self-consistency principle applied to |Ψ(t)〉 and to introduce
his radically different nonlinear consistency requirement on CTC’s [6].
On the other hand, in universal QM there is no FW. Without FW, there is no need
to save FW on a CTC. Consequently, the Deutch’s motivation to introduce his nonlinear
consistency requirement is missing. Instead, the simplest and the most natural way to
save consistency is to use the linear self-consistency constraint on |Ψ(t)〉 discussed above.
In this sense, universal QM predicts that the unusual effects on CTC’s studied in [6, 7,
8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14] cannot be realized. Perhaps observers on a CTC would not even
have an illusion of FW (which could be an interesting effect to study), but this does not
contradict any existing experience as CTC’s have not yet been prepared in laboratories.
5 Conclusions
Universal QM is a hypothesis that QM does not merely describe information accessible
to observers, but that it describes everything, including the observers themselves. In
universal QM, measurements are described by the von Neumann measurement scheme, as
entanglement between the measured system and the measuring apparatus. In particular,
the brain of the observer can also be viewed as a measuring apparatus. In universal QM
there is no room for a fundamental notion of FW, but the illusion of FW can be explained
through uncontrollable and unconscious external influences of environment degrees of
freedom on the brain. This opens the possibility to manipulate the illusion of FW by
an external manipulator, which implies that nonlocal entanglement can, in principle, be
used for the illusion of superluminal communication between manipulated observers. In
addition, the absence of true FW implies that QM on a CTC can be made consistent even
without the Deutch nonlinear consistency constraint.
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